Qualitative survey comparing four emerging agent communication protocols—MCP (tool invocation), ACP (structured messaging), A2A (enterprise task delegation), ANP (decentralized P2P)—across 11 dimensions, concluding no single protocol suffices and proposing a phased adoption roadmap from MCP → ACP → A2A → ANP.
LLM-powered autonomous agents lack standardized protocols for tool integration, context sharing, and cross-platform coordination. Ad-hoc integrations fragment the ecosystem:

Paper's Figure 1, verbatim (caption: "Protocol-aligned solution to challenges in agent communication"). Each of the four challenges maps directly to one protocol's design space: MCP solves context standardization, ACP solves messaging barriers, A2A solves collaboration absence, ANP solves internet-agnostic communication.
The survey maps each challenge to a purpose-built protocol and analyzes their architectures in depth:
| Protocol | Sponsor | Date | Architecture | Target Scope |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MCP | Anthropic | Nov 2024 | Client–Server JSON-RPC | LLM ↔ tool/service integration |
| ACP | IBM (BeeAI) | Mar 2025 | Brokered Client–Server with registry | Model-agnostic infrastructure agents |
| A2A | Apr 2025 | Peer-like Client ↔ Remote Agent | Enterprise task delegation | |
| ANP | Open-source community | 2024 | Decentralized P2P | Open internet agent interconnectivity |
The analysis covers: architecture model, discovery mechanism, identity/auth, message format, core components, transport layer, session support, target scope, primary use case, strengths, and limitations.
核心技术壁垒: The paper's central insight is that agent interoperability is a layered problem requiring distinct protocols at different trust/scope boundaries. No single protocol can simultaneously optimize for tight LLM–tool coupling (MCP), structured multimodal messaging (ACP), enterprise coordination (A2A), and trustless open-internet discovery (ANP). The composability of these layers—not any individual protocol—is the hard unsolved problem.

Paper's Figure 3, verbatim (caption: "An overview of MCP [7]"). MCP follows a client–server model where the Host application connects to MCP Servers exposing four primitives: Tools (model-controlled), Resources (application-controlled), Prompts (user-controlled), and Sampling (server-controlled). Communication uses JSON-RPC 2.0 over HTTP or Stdio with optional SSE.

Paper's Figure 4, verbatim (caption: "An overview of A2A"). A2A introduces a three-actor model (User → Client Agent → Remote Agent) where Remote Agents publish Agent Cards (JSON at /.well-known/agent.json) declaring skills, auth requirements, and I/O formats. Communication uses JSON-RPC 2.0 with SSE streaming and optional push notifications.

Paper's Figure 5, verbatim (caption: "An overview of ACP"). ACP uses a brokered architecture: ACP Client → ACP Server (middleware) → ACP Agent(s). The server handles routing, session persistence, and lifecycle management. Discovery via registry APIs or offline manifest files at /.well-known/agent.yml.

Paper's Figure 6, verbatim (caption: "An overview of ANP [12, 11]"). ANP is fully decentralized: agents identify via W3C DIDs (did:wba), publish JSON-LD agent descriptions, and discover peers through /.well-known/agent-descriptions directories. A Meta-Protocol Negotiator enables runtime protocol alignment between unknown agents.
All four protocols share a common lifecycle structure:
无形式化作者证明 — 仅实证
This is a qualitative survey with zero numbered equations, zero formal proofs, and zero empirical benchmarks. The entire evaluation is based on documentation analysis of the four protocols' specifications.
What could have been bounded: protocol composition overhead (latency/throughput when chaining MCP→ACP→A2A), discovery convergence time for ANP's decentralized registry, security attack surface area as a function of exposed endpoints per protocol layer.
6 checks:
This survey contains no empirical experiments. The analytical contribution is the comparative evaluation in Table 7 and the per-protocol security analysis.

Paper's Table 7, verbatim (caption: "Comparison of MCP, ACP, A2A, and ANP Protocols"). The 11-dimension comparison constitutes the paper's primary analytical contribution. Key differentiators: MCP is the only protocol with Stdio transport (local-first); ACP is unique in MIME-typed multipart messages; A2A uniquely uses capability-based Agent Cards for discovery; ANP alone provides DID-based trustless identity.

Paper's Table 3, verbatim (caption: "Threats and Mitigation Strategies Across the MCP Lifecycle"). MCP has the most extensive threat surface with 14 identified threats across Creation/Operation/Update phases. Notable: Tool Poisoning (malicious prompts influencing LLM behavior), Cross-Server Shadowing (one server overrides another's tool references), and Tool Redefinition ("rug pull" after initial validation).

Paper's Table 4, verbatim (caption: "A2A Lifecycle Security Challenges and Mitigation Strategies"). A2A's security model is lighter (5 threats), reflecting its enterprise-trust assumption. The unique A2A threat is Push Notification Hijacking via spoofed SSE endpoints.

Paper's Figure 2, verbatim (caption: "Timeline of Interoperability"). Three evolutionary phases visible: Symbolic/SOA Foundations (1993–2006), Retrieval and In-Model Action (2020–2023), Protocol-Oriented Interoperability (2024–2025). The 17-year gap between ESB (2006) and RAG (2020) reflects the "LLM revolution" inflection point.
| Dimension | MCP | ACP | A2A | ANP |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Architecture | Client–Server | Brokered | Peer-like | Decentralized P2P |
| Discovery | Manual/static URL | Registry-based | Agent Card (HTTP GET) | Search engine |
| Auth | Token-based + optional DID | Bearer/mTLS/JWS | DID handshake | W3C DID (did:wba) |
| Transport | HTTP/Stdio/SSE | HTTP + streams | HTTP + SSE + Push | HTTPS + JSON-LD |
| Session | Stateless + optional context | Session-aware | Session-aware or stateless | Stateless (DID tokens) |
| Weakness | Centralized + prompt injection | Registry required | Enterprise-centric | High negotiation overhead |
| Step | Claim | Evidence | Paper §§ |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Agent interoperability is fragmented: ad-hoc integrations cannot scale | Prior surveys focus on workflows, not underlying protocols; function-calling ecosystems have static tool registries and framework-specific auth | §1, §3.4 |
| 2 | Four challenges map to four distinct interoperability layers | Context standardization (MCP), messaging barriers (ACP), collaboration standards (A2A), internet-agnostic communication (ANP) — each requires different trust model and scope | §2, Fig 1 |
| 3 | Each protocol addresses one layer with a distinct architecture | MCP: JSON-RPC client–server for tools; ACP: brokered registry for typed messages; A2A: Agent Cards for task delegation; ANP: DID+JSON-LD for P2P | §4–7 |
| 4 | Protocols share lifecycle structure but differ in security posture | All use Creation/Operation/Update/Termination phases; MCP has 14 threats (broadest surface), ANP has fewest but hardest to mitigate (DID spoofing) | §4.6, §5.5, §6.3, §7.4 |
| 5 | No single protocol covers all dimensions | Table 7 shows each protocol excels in its target scope but has explicit limitations outside that scope | §8, Table 7 |
| 6 | Complementary phased adoption is the practical path | MCP (foundation) → ACP (messaging) → A2A (enterprise) → ANP (open market), ordered by maturity and integration complexity | §9 |
[实现未公开]
This is a survey paper analyzing protocol specifications rather than proposing a new implementation. The surveyed protocols have open specifications:
modelcontextprotocol.io (Anthropic, JSON-RPC spec)google.github.io/A2A/ (Google, Agent Card + Task spec)docs.beeai.dev (IBM BeeAI, RESTful HTTP spec)github.com/agent-network-protocol (community, DID + ADP spec)No reference implementation accompanies this survey itself.
/.well-known/ paths for agent metadata (A2A: agent.json, ACP: agent.yml, ANP: agent-descriptions), suggesting a de facto standard even without formal cross-protocol agreement.The fundamental unsolved problem is protocol composition: how does an agent simultaneously participate in MCP (as a tool provider), ACP (as a message receiver), A2A (as a skill executor), and ANP (as a discoverable peer)? The paper proposes phased adoption but provides no architecture for a single agent runtime that implements all four protocol interfaces, handles conflicting auth models (token vs. mTLS vs. DID), and manages the resulting state explosion across four independent lifecycle models.